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GENERAL REVENUE SHARING, NEPA, AND THE
BUREAUCRATIC PAPER SHUFFLE: VIUST THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PREPARE ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS PRIOR TO
LOCAL SPENDING DECISIONS?
And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying: "There is both good
news and bad news. The good news is that plagues shall smite your
Egyptian oppressors. The Nile shall be turned to blood, and frogs
and locusts shall cover the fields, and gnats and flies shall infest the
Pharaoh's people, and their cattle shall die and rot in the pastures,
and hail and darkness shall visit punishment upon the land of Egypt!
Then will I lead the children of Israel forth, parting the waters of
the Red Sea so that they may cross, and thereafter strewing the
desert with manna so that they may eat."
And Moses said, "0 Lord, that's wonderful! But tell me, what's
the bad news?"
And the Lord God replied, "It will be up to you, Moses, to write
the environmental impact statement."*
I. INTRODUCTION
1 T WOULD be difficult for one to assert, when comparing the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 19691 (NEPA) and the State
and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 19722 (Revenue Sharing Act),
that one piece of legislation is more important than the other. The
goals of the two Acts-environmental protection and fiscal integrity
of local governments-are both recognized as important foundations
of a healthy society.
Yet, of necessity, one of these Acts must prevail over the other
because they are presently on a collision course. The statutes are
concerned with two national priorities that are so related that overlap
between the Acts is inevitable. At the same time, the statutes spring
from mutually exclusive philosophies and employ contradictory
methods of execution. NEPA is designed to inject ecological consider-
ations into national decisionmaking by requiring the preparation of
an environmental impact statement by all federal agencies as a con-
* Originally appeared in PLAYBOy Magazine, Feb. 1975, at 106; copy-
right @ 1975 by Playboy.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
2. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-63 (Supp. II, 1972).
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dition precedent to any "major federal action significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment." In contrast, the Revenue
Sharing Act was premised on a determined opposition to entangling
federal stipulations. The legislation was designed to return control
over spending decisions to state and local governments by returning
tax dollars to those governments with a minimum of federal condi-
tions. 4 Preparation of an impact statement by the Treasury Depart-
ment prior to distribution of revenue-sharing monies is not one of
the few conditions expressly required by the Act. 5
As an overlay to this statutory stand-off, it should be observed
that during the past five years Congress has greatly expanded the
federal role in ensuring uniform national environmental standards.6
It is ironic, then, that in 1972 Congress instituted revenue sharing
without debating whether federal money should be spent in a manner
consistent with federal environmental goals and without any express
provision for environmental protection. Some commentators have
argued that in order to preserve the federal role as guardian of the
environment, NEPA should be applied to the Revenue Sharing Act
on the basis of policy considerations and on the legislative intent be-
hind NEPA itself.7 The Department of the Treasury and the Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality have countered with the assertion that
NEPA is not applicable to projects where the only federal participa-
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970). For a detailed discussion of the Act
see notes 14-24 infra and accompanying text.
4. For an examination of the legislative intent underlying the Act see
notes 94-127 infra and accompanying text.
5. For a description of the provisions of the Act see notes 34-37 infra
and accompanying text.
6. First, in 1970 Congress tacitly approved President Nixon's Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 3, which centralized the federal operation of pollution control
programs by establishing the Environmental Protection Agency. 42 U.S.C. §
4321 (1970); 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970). Secondly, the 1970 amendments
to the Clean Air Act directed the Administrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) to issue national air quality standards. Each state was
to adopt, subject to EPA approval, a plan to implement the standards. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1857b et seq. (1970). Finally, the 1972 amendments to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act gave EPA broad powers to set water quality
standards and to limit effluent discharges. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp.
1975).
7. See Note, The Application of Federal Environmental Standards to the
General Revenue Sharing Program: NEPA and Unrestricted Federal Grants,
60 VA. L. REv. 114 (1974); Westside Citizens Ass'n v. Shultz, No. C-C-74-
16 (W.D.N.C., filed Jan. 14, 1974); Carolina Action v. Simon, 389 F. Supp.
1244 (M.D.N.C. 1975). But see 1972 Dutr L.. 667, 668. See also Note,
The Council on Environmental Quality's Guidelines and Their Influence on
the National Environmental Policy Act, 23 CATH. U. L. REv. 547 (1974), de-
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tion is in the distribution of revenue-sharing funds under the Reve-
nue Sharing Act.8 Two suits have been brought in federal district
courts in North Carolina to test the relative strength of these conflict-
ing arguments. One, Carolina Action v. Simon, was recently dis-
missed on the ground that NEPA does not apply to the Revenue
Sharing Act. The other is still pending.9
A decision that the requirements of NEPA are applicable to the
scribing the extensive influence the guidelines have had on courts and agen-
cies.
The Revenue Sharing Act confines the use of revenue-sharing funds to pri-
ority expenditures. See note 34 infra. Since the priority categories include
all ordinary and necessary capital expenditures, such as the construction of
buildings, sewage treatment, systems, and highways, the use of revenue-sharing
funds will frequently have broad environmental implications. The consequent
need for environmental safeguards should not be underestimated.
8. William Sager, attorney for the Office of Revenue Sharing (a division
of the Department of the Treasury), is reported to have explained that NEPA
was not applicable to revenue sharing entitlement funds because, in the words
of the reporter, the "Department of Treasury is not funding specific programs
with revenue sharing but is rather providing general fiscal assistance. In con-
trast to other federal programs that provide aid to local and state governments,
programs undertaken with revenue sharing funds are the recipient jurisdiction's
own." Effect of Other Laws on Revenue Sharing Doubted, REVENUE SHANG
BULL., Jan. 1973, at 10.
The Treasury Department's view has also been adopted by the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ), an advisory group established by NEPA.
CEQ's guidelines for the preparation of impact statements provide that the
types of federal actions requiring the filing of an impact statement include
[nlew and continuing projects and program activities; directly under-
taken by Federal agencies; or supported in whole or in part through
Federal contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of funding
assistance (except where such assistance is solely in the form of gen-
eral revenue sharing funds, distributed under the State and Local Fis-
cal Assistance Act of 1972... with no Federal agency control over
the subsequent use of such funds) ....
40 C.F.R. § 1500.5(a) (2) (1974).
The authority of CEQ to enforce these regulations may be open to chal-
lenge since NEPA does not specify that CEQ is to interpret and enforce the
Act. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d
412, 421 (2d Cir. 1972); F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS, 102-03 (1973);
Note, The Application of Federal Environmental Standards, supra note 7, at
119-20. Nevertheless, the interpretation of a statute by the agency most in-
volved with the administration of the statute is probably entitled to great
weight. This argument is made in Federal Defendants' Supplemental Motion
to Dismiss at 3, Westside Citizens Ass'n v. Shultz, Civil No. C-C-74-16
(W.D.N.C., filed Oct. 4, 1974). See Comment, The Council on Environ-
mental Quality's Guidelines and Their Influence on the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, supra note 7, which discusses the great influence the
guidelines have had on courts and agenees.
9. Both suits sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from disburs-
ing revenue-sharing funds to Charlotte and Durham until environmental impact
19751
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Revenue Sharing Act might appear inevitable in view of the strong
mandate of NEPA itself,10 the steady ascendancy of ecological con-
cern, and the dramatic extension of NEPA's reach by the judiciary.
On the other hand, the Revenue Sharing Act involves a contradictory
mandate, as well as serious administrative obstacles to the prepara-
tion of impact statements, and a lack of federal control over the
money, which taken together may place revenue sharing beyond the
limits of NEPA established by judicial precedent.
The proper balance between the conflicting policies of NEPA
and the Revenue Sharing Act turns upon three crucial issues: First,
do the judicial precedents that have extended the mandate of NEPA
compel a holding that impact statements must be prepared prior to
distribution of revenue-sharing funds?" Secondly, are additional,
judicially imposed constraints consistent with the legislative history
of -the Revenue Sharing Act?12 And finally, would the practical prob-
lems of preparing meaningful impact statements prior to federal
dispersal of funds make filing of the statements futile? 13  The
answers to these questions indicate that the requirements of NEPA
should not be imposed upon the Revenue Sharing Act.
II. BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT AND THE STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL ASSISTANCE ACT
A study of NEPA and its interpretation reinforces the view that
its procedural requirement of preparation of an environmental im-
pact statement is a mandatory condition that attaches to all major
statements had been prepared on projects to be financed with these federal
monies. Carolina Action v. Simon, 389 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D.N.C. 1975), con-
cerned the proposed construction of a new Durham County Judicial Building
and City Hall to be financed largely with revenue-sharing funds. In holding
that NEPA did not apply, the court reasoned that CEQ's guidelines, which ex-
empt general revenue sharing from the application of NEPA, are authoritative.
(See note 8 supra for the text of the guidelines.) The court also interpreted
the legislative intent behind the Revenue Sharing Act as precluding further fed-
eral controls. Westside Citizens Ass'n v. Shultz, No. C-C-74-16 (W.D.N.C.,
filed Jan. 14, 1974), is still pending. It concerns the planned transformation
of Sugar Creek in Charlotte, North Carolina into a canal lined with hotels,
shopping centers, apartment buildings, medical complexes, and restaurants.
The project will be funded initially by revenue-sharing funds, and later by funds
from either the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) or
the Department of the Treasury.
10. See notes 15-19 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 43-87 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 94-127 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 128-66 infra and accompanying text.
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federal actions. Yet it is difficult to imagine how a meaningful en-
vironmental impact statement can be prepared under the Revenue
Sharing Act in view of the minimal substantive role of the federal
government in administering the Act. In addition, the no-strings
philosophy underlying revenue sharing and the small number of con-
ditions set forth in the Revenue Sharing Act belie an automatic
assumption that NEPA applies to the Act.
A. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
The requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA) are not made applicable to the Revenue Sharing Act
by express reference. It is arguable however, that they are superim-
posed on the Revenue Sharing Act by the force of NEPA's proclama-
tion of its applicability to all federal agencies and laws. The force
of NEPA's provisions and its power to compel compliance with its
specifications are important in analyzing its relation to the Revenue
Sharing Act.
NEPA essentially proclaims that an important goal of this
nation is protection of the environment. The Act first sets forth a
general, substantive policy aimed at preserving environmental bal-
ance and aesthetic values. The federal government is directed to
use "all practicable means, consistent with other essential considera-
tions of national policy" to achieve these aims. 14 But the strength
of the Act lies in the procedural requirements of section 102,15 often
referred to as the action-forcing provision of NEPA. In section 102,
Congress authorizes and directs that "to the fullest extent possible"
all federal agencies shall consider formally the environmental impact
of their actions and administer all public laws in accordance with the
ecological policies of the Act.:' Section 102 thus creates the now
famous environmental impact statement (EIS). The House and
Senate conferees specified that the phrase "to the fullest extent
possible" in section 102 was designed to impose a strong standard
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
15. Id. § 4332.
16. Id. The relevant part of § 102 reads:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent pos-
sible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United
States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the
policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal
government shall-
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for leg-
islation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
19751
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of compliance under that section: "The purpose of the new language
is to make it clear that each agency of the Federal Government shall
comply with the directives set out in . . . [Section 102(2)] unless
the existing law applicable to such agency's operations expressly pro-
hibits or makes full compliance with one of the directives impos-
sible."' 7 This interpretation was incorporated in the guidelines
promulgated under the Act'8 and has been adopted by the courts
as the basis of strict judicial review.'9
Probably the single most important force behind a full realization
of NEPA's power was the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC.20 The court's holding that
the regulations of the Atomic Energy Commission fail to comply
with NEPA's procedural directives is overshadowed by Judge Skelly
Wright's analysis of NEPA's mandate to federal agencies and of the
judiciary's role in giving effect to the Act. The court acknowledged
that the substantive policy of the Act is a flexible one, leaving room
for agency discretion. But it emphasized that the procedural provi-
sions in section 102, which were designed to ensure that agencies do
in fact consider environmental values in reaching policy decisions,
are not highly flexible.21 After highlighting the House conferees'
gloss on the words "to the fullest extent possible,"' 22 Judge Wright
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the re-
sponsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action....
17. H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969). See 115 CONG.
Rc. 39,702-03 (1969) for the Representatives' views. The Senators' views,
set forth in 115 CONG. REc. 40,417-18 (1969), are less strict. They specify
that each agency shall comply with the directive unless "the existing law ap-
plicable to such agency's operations does not make compliance possible." Id.
at 40,418. See text accompanying note 93 infra for a further discussion of
the language.
18. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
19. See, e.g., Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 476 F.2d
142, 150 (5th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d
1164, 1175 (6th Cir. 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA,
367 F. Supp. 122, 125 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
20. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The AEC had recently adopted reg-
ulations pursuant to NEPA to govern consideration of environmental matters
as part of its procedure for issuing permits and licenses for the construction
and operation of nuclear plants. In ruling that the regulations were insuffi-
cient the court opined that "the Commission's crabbed interpretation of NEPA
makes a mockery of the Act." Id. at 1117.
21. Id. at 1112.
22. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
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concluded with a summary of the court's duty to enforce the substan-
tive and procedural stipulations in the Act.
The reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive
decision on its merits, under Section 101, unless it be
shown that the actual balance of costs and benefits that
was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight
to environmental values. But if the decision was reached
procedurally without individualized consideration and bal-
ancing of environmental factors-conducted fully and in
good faith-it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse.
As one District Court has said of Section 102 requirements:
"It is hard to imagine a clearer or stronger mandate to the
Courts. '23
Briefly, if NEPA were to apply to the Revenue Sharing Act and thus
require the Secretary of the Treasury to prepare an EIS before dis-
bursing federal monies, the courts would presumably enjoin disburse-
ments at the beginning of each entitlement period until a procedur-
ally adequate EIS had been prepared by the federal government.
After reviewing an EIS substantively, a minority of courts might also
enjoin the release of funds until a particular project had been
modified to comply with NEPA's substantive objectives.24 Whether
such remedies conflict with the administrative mechanisms provided
for in the Revenue Sharing Act and with its underlying legislative
policy is difficult to answer. The initial step in resolving the question
involves a brief examination of the Act's provisions and structure.
B. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972
The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 197225 (Revenue
23. Id. at 1115 (footnotes omitted). Thus, where federal agencies have
failed to recognize their duty under NEPA, courts have usually enjoined the
agency action in question until a procedurally valid impact statement has been
filed. In the words of one commentator, however, courts have more recently
"examined the reality, not just the procedural formality, of the consideration
accorded environmental factors by the agencies. It now appears that the courts
will review the correctness of the final decisions made under NEPA's sub-
stantive provisions, sometimes finding on the merits that proposed actions are
not permitted under NEPA." Anderson, The National Environmental Policy
Act, in FEDERAL ENvimoNmrrAL LAw 303 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds.
1974). For a more complete discussion, see id. at 303-11. See also Note, The
Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88
HARv. L. REv. 735 (1975).
24. See, e.g., Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir.
1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th
Cir. 1972); Akers v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Tenn. 1972)). The
cases are discussed in Anderson, supra note 21, at 304-11 and F. ANDERSON,
NEPA iN THE COURTS 258-65 (1973).
25. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-63 (Supp. II, 1972).
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Sharing Act) authorized $30.2 billion to be allocated among the
states over a 5-year period, 26 on the basis of a formula that reflects
each state's population, tax effort, and income. 27 Each state govern-
ment is entitled to one-third of the amount allocated to the state for
each entitlement period;2 8 the remaining two-thirds of the state's allo-
cation is distributed directly to local governments of the state ac-
cording to a formula set forth in the Act.29  The Secretary of the
Treasury distributes the money automatically"0 upon receipt of (1)
a planned use report from the units of government outlining their
probable use of the money;31 and (2) assurances from the states and
local units that they will use accounting procedures specified by the
Secretary32 and will use the funds in compliance with the provisions
of the Act.3 3
The Act imposes only three express prohibitions on state and
local governments. First, recipients cannot use entitlement funds,
directly or indirectly, to match federal funds under any federal pro-
gram.3 4  Secondly, discrimination based on race, color, national
origin, or sex is forbidden in any program or activity funded in whole
or in part with entitlement funds.3 5 Finally, government employees
26. Id. § 1224.
27. Id. § 1225. The state share for each entitlement period is obtained
by computing two formulas and choosing the larger result. The first "formula
multiplies the population of the State by its general tax effort, multiplies this
product by the relative income of the State and then compares the resulting
product for the State with the sum of the products similarly determined for
all of the States." S. CoNF. REP. No. 92-1229, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1972).
The second formula is a five-factor formula under which
the annual rate at the start of the program was (1) $3,500,000,000
divided among the States one-third on the basis of population, one-
third on the basis of urbanized population, and one-third on the basis
of population inversely weighted for per capita income and (2)
$1,800,000,000 divided among the States one-half on the basis of in-
dividual income tax collections by State governments and one-half on
the basis of the general tax effort of the State and local governments.
Id.
28. 31 U.S.C. § 1226 (Supp. II, 1972).
29. Id. §§ 1226-27.
30. Id. § 1221.
31. Id. § 1241(b). The one-page planned use reports, which contain the
only substantive information the Treasury Department receives before it re-
leases funds, are extremely limited in content. See notes 144-166 infra and
accompanying text, which discusses the impracticalities of preparing an en-
vironmental impact statement or enforcing it under the Revenue Sharing Act's
current administrative procedures.
32. 31 U.S.C. § 1243 (a) (5) (A) (Supp. II, 1972).
33. Id. § 1243(a) (3).
34. Id. § 1223.
35. Id. § 1242. To this end, the enforcement remedies of Title V1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970), are expressly made
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whose salaries are paid with revenue-sharing funds must be paid at
least the prevailing wage for similar work, and laborers and mechan-
ics employed on construction projects where 25 percent or more of
the cost is borne by revenue-sharing funds must be paid at the pre-
vailing wage under the Davis-Bacon Act.3 6  In addition, units of
local government may use their funds only for certain priority ex-
penditures.32 There is no similar "priorities" restriction for state
governments.
The Act contemplates retrospective enforcement of the above
prohibitions after the initial receipt and use or misuse of money.88
As a simple first step, the chief executive officer of each recipient
government must certify to the Secretary of the Treasury that entitle-
ment funds have not been, or will not be, used as matching funds
or for programs paying substandard wages.39 Local governments
must also certify that the money has been used only for priority ex-
penditures.40  To reinforce these certifications, the Act also provides
for spot check audits or reviews of individual programs.41  If the
Secretary determines that a unit of government has failed to comply
substantially with the restrictions of the Act, then, after giving its
available to the Secretary. 31 U.S.C. § 1242(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
36. Id. H9 1243(a)(6), (7).
37. Id. § 1222(a). Priority expenditures means only:
(1) ordinary and necessary maintenance and operating expenditures
for-
(A) public safety (including law enforcement, fire protection,
and building code enforcement),
(B) environmental protection (including sewage disposal, sani-
tation, and pollution abatement),
(C) public transportation (including transit systems and streets
and roads),
(D) health,
(E) recreation,
(F) libraries,
(G) social services for the poor or aged, and
(H) financial administration; and
(2) ordinary and necessary capital expenditures as authorized by
law.
Id.
38. In contrast, an environmental impact statement is useful only if pro-
spective remedies, such as delaying funds or vetoing a particular project, are
available. See notes 164-66 infra and accompanying text for an elaboration
of this point.
39. 31 U.S.C. H9 1223(e), 1243(a) (6) (Supp. I1, 1972).
40. Id. § 1222(b).
41. Id. § 1243(c)(1). A mandatory standard auditing procedure by re-
cipients facilitates federal review of the recipients' records.
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chief executive officer reasonable notice and opportunity for a
hearing, he must notify the governmental unit that unless corrective
action is taken within 60 days, further payments will be withheld un-
til the Secretary is satisfied compliance has been permanently
secured.42
11. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
A. Degree of Control as a Determinative Factor
The simple language of NEPA belies the far-reaching influence
of the Act on federal procedures for decisionmaking.43 Although the
current judicial momentum behind the extension of NEPA's EIS re-
quirement 4" initially counsels that the EIS condition will inevitably
apply to revenue sharing, the factual patterns of the cases to date
suggest that an outer judicial boundary may be drawn which will ex-
clude the Revenue Sharing Act from NEPA. The critical factor
found in these cases is substantive federal control or veto power over
the specific program. If this factor is absent from general revenue
sharing, NEPA might not apply. An absence of sufficient federal
control might place a revenue sharing project outside the definition
of "major federal action," and thus eliminate the need for filing an
EIS at all.45 Such an argument has merit. The guidelines published
by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) state that for an
activity to qualify as a major federal action, there must be "sufficient
Federal control and responsibility to constitute 'Federal action' in
contrast to cases where such Federal control and responsibility are
not present, as, for example, when Federal funds are distributed in
42. Id. § 1243(b).
43. By September 1973, 4,462 impact statements had been prepared, and
over 70 departments, agencies, or subagencies had published formal implement-
ing procedures. Few agencies have been unaffected by the Act. Anderson,
supra note 23, at 246.
44. A recent case, Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, No. 409-
73 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 1974), demonstrates the extent to which NEPA has been
extended. Plaintiffs claimed that in order to implement NEPA to "the fullest
extent possible" the SEC should require corporations to disclose both adverse
and beneficial effects that their activities have on the environment. Such dis-
closure would provide necessary investment data for "ethical investors" who
are interested not merely in making money, but also in acting in a socially
responsible manner. The district court remanded to the SEC, noting that the
proposals are "non-onerous," appear to have merit, and should receive serious
consideration.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c), quoted in note 16 supra.
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the form of general revenue sharing ... .- 46 Although it may be
argued that the guidelines are not definitive because CEQ is only an
advisory body,47 the courts so far have followed this standard either
explicitly or implicitly. With one possible exception, 48 neither
money alone nor nonbinding federal advice has provided a sufficient
basis for finding a major federal action. Detailed analysis of addi-
tional criteria used in defining "major federal action" is difficult be-
cause until recently courts have not measured the facts of individual
cases against a generally applicable test. Rather, cases have been
grouped by a characterization of the federal activity, such as issuance
of a license, substantial federal involvement in a project, or initial
federal research. 49 A theme of causation is present in all the cases;
"but for" the federal activity, a project would not be started or
carried through. However, reliance upon the causation, or "but for,"
test would include too many activities within the concept of "major
federal action." Furthermore, this test is not always consistent with
the purposes of requiring an EIS.
Causation is not the only theme underlying factual patterns found
by the courts to be major federal actions. The theme of control and
agency veto power is also present. This concept, which emphasizes
federal agency power to redirect or modify particular programs is
also more consistent with the purposes behind the EIS requirement.
One goal of NEPA is to protect the environment by educating the
decisionmakers. The assumption behind the procedural EIS require-
ment is that if alternatives beneficial to the environment are
considered before project implementation, decisionmakers are likely
to make wiser decisions. Under that assumption, it only makes sense
to educate the true decisionmakers-those with control over a
project's existence and direction. Requiring an EIS from an agency
whose participation is essential (the "but for" test), but that has no
control over decisionmaking, would not be directly related to NEPA's
46. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(c) (1974) (emphasis added). These guidelines
also exempt disbursement of revenue-sharing funds from the definition of ac-
tion. Id. § 1500.5(a) (2).
47. See note 8 supra.
48. McLean Gardens Residents Ass'n v. National Capital Planning
Comn'n, 2 ENVIRONmENTAL LAw PORTm'aR [hereinafter cited as E.L.R.]
20,659 (D.D.C.), motion for stay of injunction and summary reversal denied,
2 E.L.R. 20,662 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See notes 57-60 infra and accompanying
text for a discussion of this case.
49. For a detailed analysis of the factual tests used in defining "major fed-
eral action" see F. ANDERSON, NEPA iN Ti= CouRTs 57-95 (1973). See also
Comment, 26 S.C.L. REv. 119, 132 et seq. (1974).
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goals. An analysis of some frequently cited prototypical cases
demonstrates that courts have taken this pragmatic approach.
In Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC,50 the
Atomic Energy Commission was engaged in a long-term research
program to develop the necessary technology for the Liquid Metal
Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR). The element of control was
present because in 1967 the AEC's Report to the President on
Civilian Nuclear Power had singled out the LMFBR as a priority
program among the fast breeder reactor alternatives. The Commis-
sion admitted that one of the results of its commitment to the
LMFBR was to retard development of alternative breeder reactor
programs. The court held that an EIS was necessary at the research
stage. Although AEC itself had not built a particular facility, by
developing the technology it had made a decision which would permit
utility companies to engage in action affecting the environment
through building nuclear power plants. 5 '
Jones v. Lynn52 involved a complex area renewal project in
Boston. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
remanded the suit for injunction with instructions that if any of three
tests were met, an BIS was required. One of the tests was
whether HUD possessed sufficient discretion under the contract
to alter the future course of the project. In explanation of the policy
behind its holding, the court said: "We would be reluctant not to
find a continuing major federal involvement so long as it was
established that HUD retained any significant discretionary powers
as might permit it to effect an alteration of building or design plans
to enhance the urban living environment. ' 53
The two cases frequently cited for finding a major federal action
despite minimal federal participation are Davis v. Morton5 4 and
McLean Gardens Residents Association v. National Capital Planning
Commission.55 However, the theme of control is present in both
opinions. In Davis, Indian lands were owned by the Pueblo, subject
50. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
51. Id. at 1088.
52. 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1972).
53. Id. at 890.
54. 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972). See Greene County Planning Bd. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), and Izaak Walton
League of America v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1971) for other
examples of "licensing cases."
55. 2 E.L.R. 20,659 (D.D.C. 1972), motion for stay of injunction and
summary reversal denied, 2 E.L.R. 20,662 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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to a restraint on alienation without the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior. Officials from the Interior Department approved a
lease of the land to a commercial developer. Subsequently, they
approved a master plan for the development of the total acreage,
a plat, deed restrictions, and the make-up of an architectural and
engineering review board. On the basis of these approvals, the court
found that the government was more than an "impartial, disinter-
ested party to the contract." 56 As a practical matter, the Depart-
ment of the Interior could have conditioned its approval on improve-
ments in the development plan and thus controlled the direction of
the project.
In McLean Gardens the National Capital Planning Commission
(National Commission), a federal administrative agency, gave a
favorable report to an application for a private planned unit develop-
ment in the District of Columbia. The report was given to the
District of Columbia Zoning Commission, an administrative agency
of the District of Columbia government, possessing the statutory
authority to grant variances from general zoning regulations that
would be necessary to the development of this planned unit develop-
ment. Under the statutes, the National Commission's role is purely
advisory. 57 The District of Columbia Zoning Commission must
coordinate its activities with the National Commission, but the
authority to make the final decision is vested solely in the Zoning
Commission.5" Nevertheless, the court held that an EIS was re-
quired prior to advisory approval by the National Commission. The
case appears to undercut the pattern of control seen in the other
cases. However, a closer examination of the court's opinion suggests
that either the court mistakenly thought the National Commission
had veto power over the applications, or the District of Columbia
Zoning Regulations go further then their authorizing statute by
requiring positive approval of an application by the National Com-
56. 469 F.2d at 596.
57. 40 U.S.C. § 71g(d) (1970). The relevant part of the section reads:
Any proposed change in or addition to the regulations or general
orders regulating the platting and subdividing of lands and grounds
in the District of Columbia shall first be submitted to the Commis-
sion by the District of Columbia Council for report and recommenda-
tion prior to adoption by such Council. Should the Council not con-
cur in the recommendations of the Commission, it shall so advise the
Commission with its reasons therefor and the Commission shall sub-
mit a final report within thirty days. After consideration of this final
report, the Council may proceed to take action in accordance with
its legal responsibilites and authority.
58. 5 D.C. CODE §§ 413, 417 (1973).
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mission. According to the opinion, "The D.C. Zoning Regulations
call for the review and approval of the National Capital Planning
Commission before the D.C. Zoning Commission disposes of a pre-
liminary application for a planned unit development." 59  The term
"approval" connotes control. The court next observed that the
National Commission's procedures fail to require an ]IS in those in-
stances "when the Commission's approval and concurrence is re-
quired for District of Columbia action on planned unit development
applications . ... 6 Thus, the court seemed to believe that the
National Commission did, in fact, have control over the direction of
the project. 61
One final case demonstrates that absent agency control courts
might not require an EIS. In Kings County Association v. Hardin2
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the payment of farm subsidies to users of
pesticides and fertilizers known to cause pollution of drinking water.
Plaintiffs argued that the Secretary's payment of these subsidies was
a major federal action significantly affecting the environment and
thus required an EIS. The court rejected the argument:
But [that payment of farm subsidies is a major federal
action] is simply not so. Payment of the subsidies is man-
datory under the Agricultural Act of 1970 . . . . The
recipient is free to use the money in any way he sees fit.
The fact that it (or other money of the recipient) was put
to a use affecting the environment cannot convert that pri-
vate use into federal action.63
This case bears a close relationship to those involving automatic
59. 2 E.L.R. at 20,661 (emphasis added).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. The degree to which an agency actually participates in the decision-
making process may provide another useful perspective from which to view
these cases. When an agency has control, its participation in the ultimate deci-
sion is implicit. As control decreases, participation may decrease, but it need
not. Agencies that have merely advisory roles still may have significant input
into the ultimate decisions. The structure of the decisionmaking mechanism
that was at issue in McLean makes it clear that the Planning Commission, al-
though primarily an advisor, played an integral role in the process. Each ap-
plication was reviewed by the Planning Commission before any decision could
be made by the Zoning Commission. The responsibility for evaluation under-
taken by the Planning Commission stands in stark contrast to the ministerial
duties of the Treasury Secretary under NEPA. In addition, it should be noted
that at the time of the McLean decision the District of Columbia did not have
home rule. Because the Zoning Commission was a creature of Congress, it
could be expected to be strongly influenced by the congressionally created
Planning Commission. Thus the policy considerations that recommend an EIS
when a federal agency has control would be applicable.
62. 5 ENVIRONMENT REPORTER-CASEs 1383 (9th Cir. 1973).
63. Id. at 1384.
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revenue sharing payments. The Treasury Secretary's limited ability
to deny revenue sharing funds, coupled with his lack of supervisory
control over the use of those funds, may distinguish the revenue-
sharing program-from all others to which NEPA applies. 64
B. Ely v. Velde
The factor of control also was emphasized in Ely v. Velde,65 a
case whose facts present the most convincing analogy to general
revenue sharing. The case held that an EIS had to be prepared prior
to federal funding of the construction of a prisoner center in Virginia.
The federal funds made available under the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 196866 (Safe Streets Act) were to be con-
tributed under the auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration's 67 (LEAA) block grant program. Some have ar-
gued that the similarities between a block grant and general revenue
sharing funding are sufficient to warrant the extension of the Ely
court's reasoning to a case involving general revenue sharing.68
In general there are three categories of federal grants: project
grants, block grants, and general revenue sharing. Project grants,
also known as categorical grants in aid, usually contain numerous
federal standards and conditions. Local governments seeking the
funds under such grants prepare detailed project applications jus-
tifying their need for federal assistance; the responsible federal
agency then chooses the most promising projects and disburses funds
for those projects in particular. 69 Under block grant programs and
general revenue sharing, money is distributed to states and commun-
ities by a congressionally established formula based on factors such
as population, tax effort, and need. The LEAA program and special
revenue sharing70 are referred to as block grants because fed-
64. See notes 25-42 supra and accompanying text.
65. Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va.), rev'd in part, 451 F.2d
1130 (4th Cir. 1971), on remand, 363 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Va. 1973), rev'd
497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974).
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-95 (1970).
67. The LEAA is an agency created by the Safe Streets Act.
68. See F. ANDEasON, NEPA mN Tm Cou Ts 60-61 (1973); Note, The
Application of Federal Environmental Standards, supra note 7.
69. See Tomlinson & Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards
in Grant-In-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA.
L. REv. 600 (1972).
70. One example of special revenue sharing is The Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1974. See notes 168-75 infra and accompanying
text.
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eral funds are generally available to communities for a broad
range of programs; each community then decides specifically how to
allocate the money among specific projects. With block grants a
state normally must submit a long-range plan to the administering
federal agency; agency approval of the plan is a prerequisite to
release of that state's fund allocation. Often a plan is not approved
until revisions are made to satisfy the federal administrator. In con-
trast, under general revenue sharing, money is released automatically
after receipt of a simple report from local communities. No federal
approval of the report is contemplated. 71
Four decisions are involved in Ely v. Velde: the original district
court and court of appeals decisions (referred to as Ely I), and the
second district court and court of appeals decisions made after re-
mand (referred to as Ely 11). Prior to Ely I, the Commonwealth of
Virginia applied for $870,000 in federal funds under the Safe Streets
Act to be used for the construction of a medical and reception center
for state prisioners. Plaintiffs sought an injunction against the ad-
ministrators of LEAA to prevent the allocation of federal funds for
construction of the center until an EIS had been prepared. District
Judge Mehridge denied the injunction. He found that the anti-federal
strings policy of the Safe Streets Act took precedence over the more
discretionary "to the fullest extent possible" language of NEPA.72
The court of appeals reversed in part7 3 and remanded on the ground
that the Safe Streets Act was not irreconcilable with NEPA. Ac-
cording to the court, "[w]hen two statutes present an apparent conflict,
the proper approach is to ascertain the purposes underlying both
enactments" in an attempt to harmonize them.74  The court of
71. See notes 25-33 supra and accompanying text.
72. 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971). The court reasoned as follows:
The Court is of the opinion that the conflict between [The Safe
Streets Act] and [NEPAl can be resolved. [The Safe Streets Act]
speaks in non-discretionary terms. "The Administration shall make
grants ...... (Emphasis added). However, while the Congress did
not intend the clause in NEPA, "to the fullest extent possible," to
be an escape provision, it is still discretionary. When two statutes
of equal efficacy conflict, one non-discretionary and one discretion-
ary, the non-discretionary one must prevail.
Id. at 1093 (footnotes omitted).
73. Plaintiffs had also sought an injunction against the responsible state
official forbidding the placement of the medical center in its proposed location
until the state had considered the environmental impact. The court affirmed
the district court's dismissal of this claim since NEPA imposes no duties on
state agencies. It reversed the entire companion claim against federal officials.
451 F.2d at 1139.
74. 451 F.2d 1130, 1135 (4th Cir. 1971), quoting Fanning v. United Fruit
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appeals reasoned that the congressional prohibition of federal strings
under the Safe Streets Act was based upon a fear that "overbroad
federal control of state law enforcement could result in the creation
of an Orwellian 'police force.' ,,75 This limited fear precludes only
particular federal controls. Since there is no danger of fostering a
police force by requiring an environmental impact statement, the
court of appeals in Ely I held that NEPA's mandate must be followed
by LEAA.76
Following the analysis suggested in Ely I, study of Congress'
reasons for limiting the federal strings applicable under the General
Revenue Sharing Act is crucial. During congressional debate, the
no-strings theme was founded not upon the fear of particular federal
controls, but on a broad philosophical conception of federalism
coupled with a general purpose to increase local flexibility by dis-
carding the types of limitations which had abounded in categorical
aid programs. 7 The advocates of no-strings under the Revenue Shar-
ing Act were not opposed simply to particular federal strings, but to
the limiting effect any restriction whatsoever would have on local
discretion. Consequently, the Revenue Sharing Act and NEPA
cannot be harmonized in the same manner as LEAA and NEPA
were in Ely .78
Even if the Revenue Sharing Act and NEPA could be harmo-
nized, it is not clear from the discussion in any of the Ely opinions
whether the simple distribution of funds under revenue sharing con-
stitutes a major federal action. In Ely I, the court of appeals assumed
arguendo that since the LEAA block grant provided only 20 percent
of the construction funds for the prisoner center, the grant in and
of itself was not a "major federal action." However, the court con-
tinued: "[I]n view of the LEAA's overall involvement in the promo-
tion and planning of the Center, as well as the cumulative impact of
the proposed federal action, the NEPA definition of 'major federal
action' has been satisfied." 79
Co., 355 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1966).
75. 451 F.2d at 1136.
76. Id. at 1137.
77. Hearings on the Subject of General Revenue Sharing Before the
Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 47-48, 52 (1971);
S. REp. No. 92-1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 10-11, 16 (1972).
78. This argument presupposes that the bias against federal strings is
strongly reflected in the Act; if it were not, the additional condition of NEPA
would not be contrary to legislative intent. See notes 111-22 infra and ac-
companying text.
79. 451 F.2d at 1137-38 & n.22 (citations omitted).
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After the initial court of appeals decision, Virginia withdrew its
request for federal funds and made plans to construct the center with
state funds. Thus, on remand, the district court was faced with the
question whether the initial approval by the LEAA of federal funds
for the center made the project irrevocably federal so that an EIS
would still be required for what was now a state funded project. The
court assumed that a project would become irrevocably federal once
a state received or spent federal funds. However, since federal funds
were never transferred to the state, there was "virtually no evidence
of federal contacts, significant or otherwise, with the Medical and Re-
ception Center."'8 0 The court went on to say:
The whole nature of LEAA block grants leads to the
conclusion that there was never a federal aura surrounding
the Center. As described previously, LEAA funds are
designed to be administered with a minimum of conditions
attached and with very little federal control. Programs
originally proposed can be altered, amended and substi-
tuted. The various programs specified are independent
from one another, such that an entire comprehensive plan,
for example, should not be considered as a single project
within the meaning of applicable federal law.8'
Significantly, each court's final judgment whether this particular
project was a "major federal action" turned on the degree of partici-
pation and control exercised by the federal government, not on the
amount of money involved. The circuit court of appeals' opinion
in Ely I reinforces the theme of federal controls. The court argued
that if the state were to retain federal funds that were originally ear-
marked for the prisoner center, but were later to transfer them to
less controversial projects, it would have to comply with federal en-
vironmental laws (NEPA) in constructing the prisoner center. The
courts stated: "A block grant is not the same as unencumbered reve-
nue sharing, for the grant comes with strings attached. The state
voluntarily requested federal participation in the center and in this
manner obtained construction funds conditioned upon compliance
with NEPA and NHIPA. '' s2  This gratuitous comparison between
block grants and revenue sharing is dictum, but the consistent em-
phasis of the court on federal control and supervision establishes a
standard against which any comparison between block grants and
revenue sharing must be measured.
80. 363 F. Supp. at 286.
81. Id. at 287.
82. 497 F.2d at 256.
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LEAA block grants and revenue sharing are similar in that a stat-
utory allocation formula determines each state's share of money; the
two programs differ dramatically, however, in the degree of super-
vision exercised by the responsible federal agency. Under the Safe
Streets Act, LEAA must approve a state's comprehensive plan for
use of the money before releasing funds allocated to the states by
population. The Ely II court summarized this procedure:
The evidence before the Court is that LEAA spends two
or three months reviewing the plans before approving
them. During this period, there may be considerable
dialogue between LEAA and the state agency concerning
various aspects of a given plan, with changes being made
in the plan to satisfy LEAA.83
Each time the state alters its comprehensive plan it must secure
LEAA approval of the adjustment. At the time of the Ely II district
court decision, Virginia had already secured approval for two altera-
tions of its plan84 and would have had to do so a third time in order
to retain the funds that had been allotted originally to the medical
center, but that the state later decided to use for other purposes.85
In contrast, under revenue Sharing, although the state does have to
submit planned use reports and assurances that it will use the funds
in accordance with the conditions of the Act, release of the allotted
funds is dependent upon the Treasury Department's mere receipt of
those reports, not upon the Department's approval of the plans.86
LEAA's veto power is not limited to the initial stages of approv-
ing a comprehensive plan. Under the block grant program, LEAA
extends a letter of credit upon which states can draw as they need
funds.87 LEAA can halt a state's activity in the event of noncom-
pliance with the statute, regulations, or comprehensive plan by simply
suspending the letter of credit in the middle of an allotment period.88
Under revenue sharing, the Treasury Department transfers all enti-
tlement funds to the states at the beginning of each allotment period.
If there is a violation of the Act after the transfer, the Department
can initiate administrative hearings in an effort to impose a financial
penalty or can refuse to transfer future allotments. The Department
83. 363 F. Supp. at 281.
84. Id. at 282.
85. Id. at 282-83.
86. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
87. 263 F. Supp. at 281.
88. Id.
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cannot, however, automatically stop an ongoing project or retrieve
any unused funds in that particular allotment period.89
C. Is Disbursement of Revenue-Sharing Funds a Major Federal
Action?
General revenue sharing incorporates less federal control than
does the block grant program; because of this fundamental distinc-
tion, Ely v. Velde is not binding precedent for revenue sharing. The
question remains, however, whether general revenue sharing there-
fore fails to reach the level of a "major federal action." Since the
EIS requirement is beneficial only if those preparing the statement
have the power to make adjustments in a project to reflect the results
of their EIS, revenue sharing does not involve sufficient control to
trigger an EIS. The Secretary has no substantive power over the
direction of a program prior to the release of funds.90 The role of
the federal government as little more than a conduit helps to explain
why CEQ's guidelines exclude revenue sharing from the definitions
of "action" within the meaning of "major federal action." 91
Indeed, the lack of federal control raises a real question whether
general revenue sharing is federal at all. The Treasury Department
is simply a conduit for returning income taxes to the states that gener-
ated the income. Local recipients direct the money into local proj-
ects controlled largely by local law. The money does not become
associated with any project having a significant effect on the environ-
ment until it is well beyond the federal domain. Although there are
no precedents directly on point, the underlying control theme of the
case law suggests that general revenue sharing programs may not
qualify as federal actions. This conclusion is bolstered by the legisla-
tive history of the Revenue Sharing Act, which indicates that Con-
gress did not assume that federal stipulations other than those con-
tained in the bill would be applied to general revenue sharing.92
Of course, if the Revenue Sharing Act had been in effect at the
time NEPA was passed, legislative intent probably would be irrele-
vant because the NEPA conferees from the House allowed an ex-
emption for agencies only if "existing law applicable to such agency's
operations expressly prohibits.. . full compliance. '98 However, the
89. See notes 25-42 supra and accompanying text.
90. See text accompanying notes 38-42 .upra.
91. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
92. See notes 94-127 infra and accompanying text.
93. Note 17 supra (emphasis added).
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term "existing" in that interpretation signals Congress' recognition in
1969 that future laws might be passed to which they would not want
NEPA to apply. Whether the Revenue Sharing Act was such an
exception depends on the legislative intent behind that particular
statute.
IV. LEGISLATIVE INTENT UNDERLYING THE
REVENUE SHARING ACT
The concept of returning tax dollars to local communities has had
a long history,9 4 which makes it difficult to summarize succinctly the
varied and sometimes conflicting goals that have been advanced by
champions of the concept.95 During congressional debate over the
Revenue Sharing Act, the advantages of reinvigorating the federal
system by giving local governments sufficient financial resources and
94. See generally Stolz, Revenue Sharing-New American Revolution or
Trojan Horse?, 58 MiNm. L. Rnv. 1, 5-9 (1973), which presents a history of
revenue sharing proposals.
95. Walter Heller, as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors dur-
ing the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, was a strong advocate of reve-
nue sharing for economic reasons. See W. HELLER, NEW DIMENsIoNs OF
POLrCAL ECONOMY (1966). In 1967 Richard Goodwin argued against
the trend of centering more power and authority in the federal govern-
ment, saying, "Decentralization is not abdication .... mhe guiding prin-
ciple should be the transferring to local government or private groups of the
needed resources, and the responsibility for decision, action, and policy in ac-
cordance with national standards of varying degrees of specificity." 43 COM-
MENTARY, June 1967, at 37.
Nelson Rockefeller, as the nation's senior Governor, observed in 1972, "All
three levels of government-federal, state and local-are involved in most of
the major programs, each with regulations, each providing money, and there-
fore no one can individually clean the [bureaucratic tangle] up." NATIONAL
JOURNAL, Dec. 16, 1972, at 1915.
In a message to Congress, former President Nixon stated:
While effective in many instances, this rapid growth in Federal
grants has been accompanied by:
-Overlapping programs at the State and local level.
-Distortion of State and local budgets.
-Increased administrative costs.
-Program delay and uncertainty.
-A decline in the authority and responsibility of chief executives,
as grants have become tied to functional bureaucracies.
-Creation of new and frequently competitive state and local govern-
mental institutions.
Another inevitable result of this proliferation of Federal programs
has been a gathering of the reins of power in Washington. Experi-
ence has taught us that this is neither the most efficient nor effective
way to govern; certainly it represents a radical departure from the
vision of Federal-State relations the nation's founders had in mind.
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flexibility to solve their own problems was generally recognized. 96
However, the official records chronicle an unusually philosophical
debate over the wisdom of separating the taxing and spending powers
by giving federal tax funds to local governments. The House Ways
and Means Committee, and particularly its Chairman, Representa-
tive Wilbur Mills, insisted that some federal control be maintained.
According to the House Committee report:
The basic purpose of the new assistance program is to
help State and local governments finance their vital needs.
In keeping with this objective, it is essential that the funds,
in fact, be spent for high priority purposes. In its consid-
eration of the problem, your committee studied a number
of different approaches. On the one hand, it would theo-
retically have been possible for the legislation to insure that
the aid funds are spent for desirable high-priority purposes
by setting down minute and detailed specifications as to
how the funds are to be spent. Your committee rejected
this procedure, however, because it would defeat a major
purpose of the new program, namely, to fill in a gap in
the present categorical aid programs by providing a more
flexible system of assistance.
On the other hand, the opposite approach would permit
the local governments to spend the assistance funds as they
saw fit without any strings attached to the use of the funds.
Your committee rejected this approach also on the ground
that it is wrong in principle for the Federal Government
to collect taxes and hand them over to the local govern-
ments to spend without any guidelines as to how the funds
are spent. In effect, this procedure would divorce com-
pletely the responsibility for raising revenue from the
H.R. Doc. No. 91-148, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969), set forth in 115 CONG.
RiEc. 23,746 (1969) (Message from the President). See National Tax Associ-
ation Seminar, Balancing Our Federal-State-Local Fiscal System, 24 NAT'L TAX
J. 278-399 (1971), for a variety of other viewpoints.
96. S. REP. No. 92-1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 16 (1972); H. REP.
No. 92-1018, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 7 (1972). Some argued, however,
that even if Congress did intend to return power to local governments under
general revenue sharing, the federal government would gradually reassert con-
trol over its own money and thus over recipients of the money. Dissenting
members of the House Committee on Ways and Means stated:
This bill takes the unprecedented step of underwriting, at the federal
level, the general governmental expenditures of state and local gov-
ernments. The dependence of state and local governments on federal
largess to meet their basic governmental responsibilities will result in
the federal government eventually prescribing how state and local
governments must meet their responsibilities. The Chairman [Wil-
bur Mills] pinpointed the true nature of revenue sharing with a very
apt metaphor last year when he stated that revenue sharing is more
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spending of revenue. This would have meant no balance
of priorities between taxing and spending.97
Reflecting the Chairman's view, the House bill imposed limited
"priority expenditure" categories on local governments. Federal
funds could be used for necessary maintenance and operating ex-
penses in only three areas: safety, environmental protection, and
public transportation.9" In addition, funds could be used for capital
expenditures only in the areas of sewage collection and treatment,
refuse disposal systems, and public transportation.99
On the other hand, the Senate Finance Committee, under the
chairmanship of Senator Russel B. Long, did not attach any strings
through the use of priority categories to limit how the funds could
be spent. The bill did, however, prohibit discrimination on the
grounds of race, color, national origin, or sex, and banned the use
of federal revenue sharing monies as matching funds for other federal
programs. 100 The Administration supported the Senate in advocat-
ing a no-strings approach.1' 1 The House and Senate bills were
passed by their respective houses without substantial changes.
Both Chairman Long and Chairman Mills described the confer-
ence report as a compromise between the two positions in the Senate
in the nature of a Trojan horse from which at the appropriate time
will spring new rules and strictures on the activities of those very
governmental bodies who are being wooed by this gift from Troy.
H.R. REP. No. 92-1018, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1972) (views of dissent-
ing members).
97. H.R. REP. No. 92-1018, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972) (views of dis-
senting members).
98. 118 CONG. REc. 35,896 (1972).
99. Id.
100. S. REP. No. 92-1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 3 (1972). The
Senate Report explained:
The House bill would have required the funds to be used only for
a limited number of so-called high-priority purposes. On the other
hand, the committee believes that one of the principal virtues of reve-
nue sharing is the fact that this program is different from the cate-
gorical grant programs. If "no strings are attached," the funds may
be spent by the local government for what the local citizenry recog-
nize as their high priority purposes, rather than having priorities es-
tablished by the Federal Government for them which could conflict
with their own interests.
Id.
101. In a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to Senator Long, the
Department opposed priority expenditure categories. "A Third aspect of the
bill that the Department recommends change in involves the high-priority ex-
penditure categories that the localities must spend within. The Department
recommends that these categories be eliminated to allow them sufficient flexi-
bility in setting their own priorities." Printed in Hearings on H.R. 14370 Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on Finance, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 91, 92 (1972).
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and House bills.10 2  An examination of the provisions in the confer-
ence bill suggests, however, that the philosophy of the Senate in fact
prevailed. As Senator Long put it, "we have expanded the list of
eligible priority expenditures to the point where they now include the
bulk of the items on which the local governments ordinarily spend
their money.'1 0 3
Under the conference bill and the final Act, federal funds can
be spent for ordinary and necessary maintenance and operating ex-
penses in five new areas in addition to the three areas permitted by
the House bill. These new areas were health, recreation, libraries,
social services for the poor or aged, and financial administration. 10 4
Even more significantly, the conferees expanded the permissible cap-
ital expenditures from the three areas allowed by the House bill 05
to all ordinary and necessary capital expenditures authorized by
law.' 0 6 Even without the large increase of permissible priority ex-
penditure categories, both the Senate Committee and members of the
House Committee acknowledged that the limiting effect of priority
categories was largely illusory. Since the Revenue Sharing Act con-
tains no requirement that local governments maintain previous levels
of expenditures in the priority categories, federal funds could be used
to replace local funds in the priority categories, thus releasing local
funds for use in nonpriority categories.' 07 Indeed such substitution
102. 118 CONG. R c. 35,895 (1972) (Senate); 118 CoNG. Rac. 35,496-98
(1972) (House).
103. 118 CONG. REc. 35,896 (1972).
104. See note 37 supra.
105. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
106. Id.
107. Members of the Ways and Means Committee who had cosponsored the
Administration bill observed:
The Committee bill, unlike the Administration bill, does specify cer-
tain high priority purposes for which the local government allocations
must be used. However, the absence of any "maintenance of effort"
requirements with respect to local government expenditures should as-
sure that these limitations will not operate in an unduly restrictive
manner.
H.R. REP. No. 92-1018, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1972).
As the Senate Committee put it,
The committee believes that the State and local governments will be
able to make the most efficient use of the aid funds if they are given
the authority to determine how these funds are to be used ....
mhe adoption of high priority items in the House bill merely results
in substantially complicating the mechanics of the aid program with-
out any real substantive effect on spending by the local governments.
A complicated and elaborate procedure would be required to deter-
mine that the local governments spend the aid funds only on the high
priority items. However, since the local governments are not re-
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of funds has apparently been occurring fairly frequently.'0 s
The other major focus of the strings versus no-strings debate was
the desirability of requiring state and local governments to comply
with federal statutes when using federal revenue-sharing funds. Both
the Senate and the House generally agreed that the Revenue Sharing
Act should require conformity with Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, 0 9 and with minimum wage standards of the Davis-Bacon
Act."x0 Although the details of these particular provisions in the
Revenue Sharing Act are not critical to the discussion of legislative
intent,"' debate in the Senate concerning the provisions is important
in establishing that at least the Senate believed that the Civil Rights
Act and appropriate minimum wage protections were the only fed-
eral provisions that should be applicable to revenue sharing.
During the Senate debate Senator Vance Hartke introduced
amendments to guarantee a certain wage level for government em-
ployees and construction workers whose salaries are paid with reve-
nue-sharing funds." 2 The fact that these amendments were sup-
ported by labor" 3 and by the administration, 1 4 and that one had
been approved by the House,"z5 although eliminated in Senate com-
mittee, may explain Senator Long's eventual willingness to al-
low a compromised version to become law." 6  Both amendments
quired to maintain the level of their own prior expenditures on the
high priority items, (i.e., expenditures financed out of their own reve-
nue sources), as a practical matter, they could arrange to use the aid
funds to increase their spending for other than high priority items.
As a result, provision of the high priority categories, at best, is il-
lusory.
S. RE. No. 92-1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1972). See also text accompany-
ing note 147 infra.
108. See notes 148-50 infra and accompanying text.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970).
110. 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a through a-5 (1970).
111. See Stolz, Revenue Sharing-New American Revolution or Trojan
Horse?, 58 MINN. L. REv. 1, 82-92 (1973), for a more detailed discussion of
these provisions.
112. 118 CONG. REc. 29,511, 29,519 (1972). See Stolz, supra note 111,
at 82-85 for a more extensive legislative history of these amendments.
113. See Hearings on H.R. 14370 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 208 (1972) (testimony of Jerry Wurf, President, Ameri-
can Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, July 21,
1972).
114. 118 CONG. Ruc. 29,520 (1972).
115. H.R. 14370, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 105(a)(6) (1972).
116. It should be noted, as indicative of Senator Long's bargaining strength
and the importance of his views, that the provision that came out of conference
was less strict than the provisions that had been passed by either the House
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were passed'1 " subject to the proviso, outlined by Senator Hu-
bert Humphrey in response to Senator Long's criticism, that the wage
provisions would apply only when 25 percent of the salaries of the
governmental employees or 25 percent of construction costs of a proj-
ect were paid with revenue-sharing funds."-8 The purpose of the 25
percent limitation was to ensure that federal wage standards would
not be imposed unless substantial federal funds were used. Other-
wise, as Senator Long had pointed out, where the proportion of reve-
nue sharing used in a project was small, the increased costs of com-
plying with the Hartke wage standards might have exceeded the fed-
eral contribution, and thereby undercut the fiscal relief purposes of
revenue sharing." 19
Senator Long's opposition to the imposition of further federal
standards received Senate support when another Hartke amendment
was defeated. This amendment would have applied labor standards
in the 1964 Urban Mass Transportation Act 20 to urban mass transit
systems acquired by local government units with federal revenue-
sharing funds.' 2 ' Before the vote on that amendment, Senator Long
made his most forceful argument against federal strings:
Mr. President, under the Senator's logic we can take
every desirable condition that has been put on aid to edu-
cation from the kindergarten to a postgraduate degree and
say if 1 nickel of revenue-sharing money finds its way into
the schools, colleges, or kindergartens, they must comply
with all of those conditions. When you put those condi-
tions on, they must pay the cost to comply. Here we say
if even 1 nickel of revenue sharing gets into the hospital,
for instance, it must comply with all of the conditions of
the Hill-Burton Act; if 1 nickel gets into the highway pro-
gram, all of the conditions of Federal aid to highways must
be met. We have standards for the construction of sewers.
The county would have to comply with all the Federal
standards for the construction of a sanitary system. If they
want to put in a day care center, they would have to com-
ply with all the Federal conditions for day care centers.
The problem is there are so many conditions that the local
governments could not comply with all of them without a
or the Senate.
117. 118 CONG. REc. 29,526 (1972).
118. Id. at 29,517, 29,525. Senator Humphrey's original proposal was for
a 50 percent limit. The 25 percent limit was adopted at Senator Long's sug-
gestion.
119. Id. at 29,519.
120. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-12 (1970).
121. 118 CONG. REc. 29, 531 (1972).
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tremendous burden, if they were to get even 1 nickel of
revenue sharing money.
Those examples are just as logical as someone's union
rights. There is no end to the conditions the minds of men
could conceive along this line. If Senators are against the
bill, they should vote for the amendment. These are the
kinds of things that everybody agrees will kill revenue
sharing-or the sort of conditions that local governments
would find it difficult to comply with. 122
Of course, it can be argued that if Congress had not wanted
NEPA to apply to the Act, it would have specifically exempted it.
The fact that Congress has made four statutory exceptions 123 to
NEPA's mandate lends credence to the argument that, in the ab-
sence of an express dispensation, Congress intended NEPA's un-
usually strong mandate to apply to the Revenue Sharing Act. There
are two weaknesses in this argument. First, three of the four statu-
tory variations in NEPA's coverage were enacted after the Revenue
Sharing Act.' 2 4 Therefore, they fail to raise a presumption that Con-
gress was following a pattern in 1972. The Revenue Sharing Act
was passed only one year after the Calvert Cliffls25 court announced
the broad application of NEPA to all other federal actions. Al-
though the Calvert Cliffs' opinion was theoretically arresting, only
time and the repeated application by other courts of NEPA's provi-
sions to unlikely federal agencies impressed the public as well as
Congress with the unusual force behind the statute. It is certainly
arguable, then, that in 1972, Congress had not concluded that an
122. Id. at 29,530-31.
123. The four exceptions are: (1) a provision in the Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972 which exempted most of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency's water pollution control activities from NEPA's EIS require-
ment, 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (Supp. II, 1972); (2) § 203(d) of the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1652(d) (Supp.
1975), which authorized construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline without
further administrative or judicial action under NEPA; (3) a special provision
in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, which specified that the San Antonio
Expressway in Texas was no longer a federal project, thereby permitting its
completion despite failure to comply with NEPA, Pub. L. No. 93-87, 87 Stat.
250; and (4) the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, which
allowed local recipients to assume the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment's duty to prepare impact statements, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat.
633. See notes 168-75 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this
last exception.
124. Only the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 were en-
acted before revenue sharing. See note 123 supra for the dates of the statutes.
125. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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express exemption was required to prevent the application of NEPA
to other enactments.
Secondly, the argument favoring application of NEPA to the
Revenue Sharing Act by implication ignores the treatment given by
the Congress to another far-reaching statute, the Civil Rights Act.
The Civil Rights Act, which not only enunciates a strong congres-
sional priority, but reflects a basic constitutional policy to eliminate
racial discrimination, 126 has like NEPA been broadly construed to
apply to many federal statutes.' 27 As a result, title VI of that Act is
as likely to apply to the Revenue Sharing Act without an express ref-
erence as is the National Environmental Policy Act. The fact that
Congress, aware of both Acts, chose to include the former explicitly
while omitting all reference to the latter presents a strong argument
that Congress intended only those federal statutes that it expressly
included in the bill to apply to the Revenue Sharing Act. The
principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio al-
terius, is particularly appropriate in this situation.
In conclusion, while there is no clear evidence that in 1972 Con-
gress specifically analyzed the interrelation of NEPA and revenue
sharing, there is ample evidence that Congress considered and re-
jected as a general proposition the application of any federal stand-
ards other than those in the bill. For the courts to elevate NEPA
over all other nondiscretionary statutory requirements and hold that
it alone applies to the Revenue Sharing Act without express inclusion
would infringe on Congress' legislative prerogative.
V. PRACTICALITY OF PREPARING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENTS UNDER THE REVENUE SHARING ACT
The NEPA conferees stated that "compliance to the fullest ex-
tent possible" means that each agency is to comply with the section
requiring an EIS "unless the existing law applicable to such agency's
operations. . . makes full compliance with one of the directives im-
possible.' 128 Thus, a conclusion that preparation by the Treasury
Department of a meaningful EIS would be an impossible or futile
126. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIII, XIV & XV.
127. See, e.g., Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1240-41 (4th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Medical Soc'y, 298 F. Supp. 145, 151-52 (D.S.C. 1969), and
cases cited therein.
128. See text accompanying note 17 supra for the complete quotation of the
House conferees' views. The Senate conferees did not use the same language;
however, their meaning is substantially the same. S'ee note 17 supra.
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task would exempt the Revenue Sharing Act from NEPA on two sep-
arate grounds. First, the lack of an administrative mechanism for
preparing an EIS would reinforce the view that drafters of the Reve-
nue Sharing Act did not intend NEPA to apply; and second, the im-
possibility of other than pro forma compliance would bring the Reve-
nue Sharing Act within one of the exceptions allowed by NEPA it-
self.
A crucial issue, then, is when is compliance considered "impossi-
ble"? In Calvert Cliffs' the court stated, "[C]onsiderations of ad-
ministrative difficulty, delay or economic cost will not suffice to strip
the section of its fundamental importance."'129 Although this lan-
guage has been quoted in subsequent decisions as a standard of strict
compliance, 130 it also can be read to mean that mere inconvenience
does not reach the level of impossibility. This alternative interpreta-
tion seems to have been adopted by a line of cases in which courts
have modified the "no exceptions" standard of compliance when
faced with counterproductive delays or a likelihood of infeasibility.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,' 3' the
court stated that in interpreting NEPA's section 102 requirement of
compliance "to the fullest extent possible," the courts must consider
"that the resources of energy and research-and time-available to
meet the Nation's needs are not infinite.' 32 NEPA is subject to a
"construction of reasonableness."' 33 Judge Harold Leventhal of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
has emphasized that this case stands for limitations on the demands
that may legitimtely be drawn from NEPA:
[Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton]
. ..does not undercut Calvert Cliffs' insistance that en-
vironmental consequences be given consideration. It
rather ensures that such consideration will be provided in
the context of a viable decisionmaking process, a process
not throttled with burdens that are unproductive or coun-
ter-productive. The two decisions in composite stand for
the two sides of the coin of judicial review-to ensure
129. 449 F.2d at 1115.
130. E.g., Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972); 1-291
Why? Ass'n v. Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223, 238 (D. Conn. 1974); Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167, 169 (D.D.C.
1971).
131. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
132. Id. at 837.
133. Id.
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supervision of the agencies and to refrain from excessive
intrusion.' 34
Louisiana v. Federal Power Commission,3 5 in which oil companies
sued to require the Commission to issue impact statements before ap-
proving plans to allocate natural gas deliveries in times of shortage,
echoes the rule of reason set forth in Morton. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that impact statements
were required for permanent, but not interim, curtailment plans. The
court advised that the Federal Power Commission "should not pour
an inordinate amount of its resources into environmental forecasting"
since "the statute itself requires compliance to the fullest extent pos-
sible, recognizing that some situations are more conducive to environ-
mental analysis than others."' 136 These two cases, while recognizing
limits on the reach of NEPA, still required impact statements of some
kind. A balance was thus struck between the mandate of NEPA
and the integrity of the federal program in question.
Other courts have exempted particular programs from the EIS
requirement entirely. In Cohen v. Price Commission137 the court
held that NEPA did not apply to the Price Commission because the
Commission's effectiveness under the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970138 required speedy action. In Gulf Oil v. Simon'3 9 the Federal
Energy Office was not required to prepare an EIS before promulgat-
ing mandatory crude oil allocation regulations because of the critical
time limitations imposed by the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
of 1973.140 Exemptions have not been based only on emergency
conditions. A number of circuit courts have exempted various pro-
134. Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 521 (1974). In Calvert Cliffs', Judge Wright de-
clared, "Section 102 duties are not inherently flexible. They must be complied
with to the fullest extent, unless there is a clear conflict of statutory authority."
449 F.2d 1115 (emphasis original). See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra
for a more detailed discussion of the case.
135. 503 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1974).
136. Id. at 877.
137. 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The case involved a challenge
to the Price Commission's authorization of a 5-cent fare increase on New York
subway and buslines, a toll increase on bridges and tunnels, and parking rate
increases.
138. 12 U.S.C. § 1904, n. § 202 (Supp. 11, 1972).
139. 373 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C.), af'd per curiam, 502 F.2d 1154 (Emer.
Ct. App. 1974).
140. Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 629. Noting that the Petroleum Alloca-
tion Act contemplated that regulations would take effect 30 days after enact-
ment and that compliance with NEPA would require a minimum of 120 days
after enactment, the court concluded, "In light of the exhaustive analytical con-
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grams administered by the Environmental Protection Agency from
NEPA on the ground that either the program's own authorizing stat-
ute required the functional equivalent of a NEPA impact state-
ment,141 or there was no need -for such a statement because of EPA's
independent responsibility for protecting the environment. 142
Although the Revenue Sharing Act certainly does not provide a
functional equivalent to a NEPA statement and probably does not
constitute emergency legislation that would bring general revenue
sharing within the exemption precedents, the Act may offer grounds
for a new exception. The evolving modification of the Calvert Cliffs'
standard and the outright exemption of particular agencies for prac-
tical reasons suggests that courts might hold that compliance "to the
fullest extent possible" does not require a disruptive or futile impact
statement.
tent required of impact statements, it would be illogical, indeed virtually impos-
sible, to demand a statement in this instance." 373 F. Supp. at 1105.
141. The leading case on this point is Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckels-
haus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), which held that EPA was not obliged
to file an EIS before promulgating stationary source standards for new or mod-
ified cement plants under § 111 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6
(1970). See also Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973);
Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power
Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973), in which NEPA was held to be
inapplicable to the EPA's approval of state implementation plans under the
Clean Air Act.
In Anaconda Copper Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 352 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo.
1972), rev'd 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973), the district court held that the
EPA was required to file an EIS, but the court of appeals, citing Buckeye
Power, Inc., Duquesne Light Co., and Appalachian Power Co., reversed.
Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
offers an analogous holding with respect to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1970). The court held that no
EIS was required prior to EPA's cancellations of registrations for most uses
of DDT. As the court wrote:
In this particular case, lengthy hearings were held, during which pub-
lic comment was solicited, and a wide scope of environmental aspects
were considered. Thus the functional equivalent of a NEPA investi-
gation was provided, for all of the five core NEPA issues were care-
fully considered: the environmental impact of the action, possible ad-
verse environmental effects, possible alternatives, the relationship be-
tween long- and short-term uses and goals, and any irreversible com-
mitments of resources--all received attention during the hearings and
decision-making process. The law requires no more.
Id. at 1256 (footnotes omitted).
142. In International Harvester Co. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.
1973), the court of appeals stated, "Although we do not reach the question
whether EPA is automatically and completely exempt from NEPA, we see
little need in requiring a NEPA statement from an agency whose raison d'etre
is the protection of the environment .... Id. at 650 n.130.
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Under this approach the pivotal question is just how impractical
is the preparation of an EIS under the Revenue Sharing Act. The
answer depends on whether the Department of the Treasury can ob-
tain, prior to disbursement of funds, meaningful and accurate infor-
mation about a recipient's projected use of the funds. Under the
Revenue Sharing Act, each state or local unit of government must
submit a so-called planned use report to the Secretary, setting forth
the amounts and purposes for which it plans to spend or obligate its
entitlement funds during the forthcoming period. 14  A duplicate
must be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
state.' 44 Originally, the planned use report was one page in length.
However, according to the first annual report of the Office of Reve-
nue Sharing (ORS), ORS has had to simplify the form even further
because a number of small governments found it difficult to comply
with requirements.' 45 If the Department of the Treasury were re-
quired to prepare a detailed environmental impact statement before
releasing funds, the planned use reports would have to be lengthened
considerably, making participation by small governmental units con-
siderably more difficult.
Additionally, representations made by local governments in the
planned use reports would have to be final. This would lock local
governments into a particular use for the funds and thus further un-
dermine the congressional goal of increased flexibility in local spend-
ing decisions.' 46
There is a more serious problem. Even if one were to conclude
that planned use reports should be expanded to permit the prepara-
tion of detailed impact statements, evidence indicates that those
planned use reports would not accurately reflect the true use of reve-
nue-sharing funds by local governments. Mr. Richard P. Nathan
of the Brookings Institution, who is part of a team conducting a 5-
year monitoring study of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act
of 1972, testified before a Senate subcommittee in June 1974. He
stated that the Brookings study indicates that many local governments
have substituted revenue-sharing monies for local revenue in the pri-
ority categories under the Act and then used the released local money
143. 31 U.S.C. § 1241(b) (Supp. TI, 1972).
144. Id. § 1241(c).
145. U.S. DEPr. oF THE TREAsuRY, ANN. REP. OF THE OFFICE OF REvENuE
SHARING 22 (1974).
146. S. REP. No. 92-1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 16 (1972); H. Rep.
No. 92-1018, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 7 (1972).
ority categories under the Act and then used the released local money
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for other projects, including projects that could not have been funded
directly with revenue-sharing money.147 According to the study, the
average local government used 42.2 percent of its revenue-sharing
money to replace local money in existing programs; statistics were
not offered on the percentage of released local money that was then
used for nonpriority expenditures. The findings of the Brookings
study upon the substitution effect have been reinforced, though not
documented so thoroughly, by a Government Accounting Office re-
port, 148 direct testimony of one Governor,14 and a report by the Ad-
147. Hearings on Revenue Sharing Before the Subcomm. on Intergovern-
mental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Operations, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 424 (1974).
Mr. Nathan: . . . For instance although a given recipient gov-
ernment may "attribute" shared revenue to police protection, if it does
not spend any more money for police than it would have anyway,
then the real uses--or what we have called the net fiscal effects of
revenue sharing-must be sought somewhere else. Our data indicates
that there has been a substantial substitution effect in the use of
shared revenue. That is to say, significant amounts of these funds
have been used-not for new spending-but to cut taxes, hold down
taxes, balance the budget, or avoid borrowing which otherwise would
have been undertaken ...
Senator Muskie: Could they also be used to fund programs which
could not be funded directly by revenue sharing under the law?
Mr. Nathan: . . . You are right. The so called fungibility of pub-
lic money permits state and local officials to use these financial re-
sources interchanageably, and in doing so, because-and this is a
phrase we have highlighted-because all money is green, there are
opportunities for them to assign or attribute shared revenue to partic-
ular functions among the priority expenditure categories in the act,
but not to add expenditures to that category and then to use shared
revenue for some other purpose.
148. COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTiNG OFFicE, REvENUE-
SHARING: ITS UsE By AN ImPACT ON STATE GOVERNMENTS (1973). The
GAO reported:
The actual impact of revenue sharing on a State may be quite differ-
ent from and more elusive than the apparent impact indicated by the
use a State makes of its funds. When a State uses the funds to
wholly or partially finance an activity which the State's own revenues
previously financed, it becomes difficult to objectively identify the ac-
tual impact.
Id. at 2.
149. Political reporter David Broder of the Washington Post has written,
Maryland's Gov. Marvin Mandel was one of the.. . Governors urg-
ing the congressional Democrats not to rely on the official accounting
reports to gauge where revenue-sharing money really went. Mandel
said he had reported planning all of Maryland's allotment in the bond
annuity fund, simply to avoid any administrative problems, "but that
has nothing to do with how the money was really spent."
Broder, Governors Get Warning About Tax Sharing, Washington Post, June
25, 1974, as reprinted in HEAiNGs ON REvENUE SHARING, note 147 supra, at
131.
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visory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. 150
If substitution is legal, preparation of a meaningful environ-
mental impact statement will be virtually impossible. Local govern-
ments will channel all federal -funds into projects having a minimal
environmental effect and will redirect the released local funds for
highways and other environmentally related projects. The Depart-
ment of the Treasury could either prepare a useless report on the
projected direct use of federal funds in the innocuous programs or
could require detailed projected budgets and attempt to gauge the
probable real impact of the federal funds. Such an attempt would
pit the Department of the Treasury against state and local govern-
ments in a costly and time-consuming shell game.
This problem may be mitigated by Matthews v. Massell,151 the
only federal revenue-sharing case to date, which holds the substitu-
tion pattern described by Mr. Nathan to be violative of the Revenue
Sharing Act. In Matthews the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia found that the use of $4.5 million in
revenue-sharing funds. to pay firemen's salaries (a legitimate priority
expenditure), which thus freed $4.5 million in local funds that the
City of Atlanta proposed to disburse in the form of a water/sewer
rebate, was a sham transaction, circumventing the congressional in-
tent that federal funds should be used only for priority expenditures.
Despite the apparently broad holding, a close reading of the opinion
suggests that the court objected to the dispersal of released funds in
the form of a limited tax rebate rather than to the simple substitution
of federal funds for local general revenues. The court referred to
the former as a sham transaction, while recognizing that in other cir-
cumstances some local funds might be legitimately freed-up by the
infusion of revenue-sharing funds.' 52
The difficulty with the opinion is that the court failed to differ-
150. The Commission reported, "[G]overnors, legislators, mayors, county of-
ficials, and city managers who appeared at Commission hearings have testified
that they have experienced little or no difficulty in getting the money to where
their government most needed it." Again, the "lack of revenue and expendi-
ture maintenance requirements and the virtual impossibility of distinguishing
revenue sharing dollars" explains the easy avoidance of federal strings. AD-
vISORY CoMMrIssIoN ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RE.LATIONS, GENERAL REVENUE
SHARING: AN ACIR REEVALUATION 3-4 (1974).
151. 356 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
152. The court observed:
It is true that the Revenue Sharing Act does not specifically im-
pose any restrictions upon the use of legitimately freed-up funds.
Thus the Act seems clearly to have contemplated that the infusion
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entiate clearly between a sham transaction and legitimate substitu-
tion. The Matthews court recognized that there was no case law un-
der the Revenue Sharing Act to guide it in discerning sham transac-
tions, but noted that "[i]n the areas of federal income taxation, securi-
ties law, and antitrust statutes the courts have consistently refused
to exalt artifice over reality or to ignore the actual substance of a
particular set of transactions."'1 5 3 A similar position was propounded
recently in a student note: "The courts have had little trouble in
distinguishing legitimate financial transactions from those entered in-
to for the purpose of avoiding a particular regulation or statutory
prohibition."' 54  This view seems overly optimistic, however, and
presents further problems in the context of revenue sharing. In the
tax cases, for example, the criteria for determining whether a par-
ticular transaction is a sham have been far from clear. In discussing
of Revenue Sharing funds into state and local governments would per-
mit future tax relief to the hard-pressed taxpayers of those govern-
ments. Further, there is no requirement that a local government
maintain at pre-Revenue Sharing levels its spending on "priority ex-
penditures." There is a clear difference, however, between funds
which are legitimately freed up by the designation of federal Revenue
Sharing funds to provide municipal services which otherwise would
have to have been paid for out of general City funds, and funds
which are transferred from one account to another simply to avoid
the restrictions imposed by section 102(a) of the Ac.L The actions
of defendants, the public statements made by defendant Mayor Mas-
sell and the affidavits of three of the defendant members of the Board
of Aldermen, show clearly that the stops taken by defendants were
designed to carry out a plan to return $4.5 million in Revenue Shar-
ing funds to certain taxpayers, the defendants having decided to con-
fer such tax relief by way of rebates on the water/sewer accounts.
Id. at 299 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
In contrast to the court's reasoning, the language of the Act suggests that
all substitutions of funds may be valid. Section 103 specifies simply that
"funds received by units of local government under this subtitle may be used
only for priority expenditures." 31 U.S.C. § 1222(a) (Supp. II, 1972). Since
the funds actually received by Atlanta were used for priority purposes, the facts
of Matthews appear to meet this straightforward requirement. By precluding
an indirect use of federal funds for nonpriority expenditures, the court has, in
effect, incorporated into § 103 language found in a separate section. Sec-
tion 104 provides: "No State government or unit of local government may use,
directly or indirectly, any part of the funds it receives under this subtitle . ..
as matching funds. 31 U.S.C. § 1223 (Supp. II, 1972). Congress' omission
of "directly or indirectly" in § 103 appears to reflect a decision to adopt
a less stringent standard for that section.
153. 356 F. Supp. at 299-300.
154. Note, The Application of Federal Environmental Standards to the
General Revenue Sharing Program: NEPA and Unrestricted Federal Grants,
60 VA. L. REV. 114, 133 (1974).
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Gregory v. Helvering'55 Randolph Paul observed, "The trouble with
dependence upon free or liberal statutory interpretation of a taxing
statute, is that no one can be sure when it will be employed."' 56 In
analyzing Knetsch v. United States'57 Professor Walter Blum con-
cluded that courts would "get little comfort or guidance from the
Knetsch case."'u5 He went on to say, however, that "judicial
vagueness" might be of value in the tax avoidance area because of
its in terrorem effect.159 Such a judicial attitude would be antitheti-
cal to the goals of revenue sharing, however, since it would limit
local flexibility and raise a constant spector of federal intervention.
Likewise, the liberal construction given to the antitrust' 60 and securi-
ties' 6 ' laws to provide broad protection in order to implement their
important remedial purposes is anomalous in the context of revenue
sharing, where federal intervention is intended to be minimal.
In a letter ruling on the subject, the Department of the Treasury
appears to have attempted to limit the effect of Matthews by con-
fining the decision to the facts of that case. The Department takes
the position that "neither the Act nor the regulations prohibit a re-
cipient government from amending its budget to place revenue-shar-
ing funds within a priority expenditure category and thereby 'free-
up' funds to be used for other purposes."' 62  Thus the problem of
155. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
156. R. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 265 (1937). For a discussion
of the problems courts have had in determining the criteria which characteirze
a sham, see Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax
Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440 (1968).
157. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
158. Blum, Knetsch v. United States: A Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance,
1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 135, 158.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 16-17 (1964); Sugar
Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936).
161. See, e.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); SEC v. North
American R. & D. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 71 (1970).
162. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, ONE YEAR OF RULINGS ON GEN-
ERAL REVENUE SHARING: A DIGEST IV-4 (1974), as reprinted in Hearings on
Revenue Sharing, note 125 supra, at 264. The relevant text of the letter ruling
reads:
F. DISPLACEMENT OF LOCAL REVENUES TO A NON-
PRIORITY EXPENDITURE AND REPLENISHMENT WITH
REVENUE SHARING FUNDS.
Generally
Matthews v. Massell . . . is known as the "Atlanta Case." At
issue in that case was whether local funds, freed-up by the appropri-
ation of general revenue sharing funds to a priority category, could
be used for non-priority purposes. Under the facts of that case, the
Court enjoined the City of Atlanta from implementing its plan to
expend its freed-up money for nonpriority purposes.
[Vol. 25:797
REVENUE SHARING AND NEPA
shifting funds to avoid an EIS remains a real and serious impedi-
ment to the application of NEPA.'163
Even assuming that the Department could prepare realistic im-
pact statements, the final problem of practicality stems from the Sec-
retary's lack of power under the Act to do anything prospectively
about a planned misuse of funds.' 64 Since the Secretary's powers
are all retrospective, triggered by an actual violation of the Act, a
predisbursement impact statement would be of limited utility. As
the Department of the Treasury has argued:
The Secretary's responsibility is to pay revenue sharing
entitlements (31 U.S.C. § 1221) to those governments
who provide the assurances set out at 31 U.S.C. § 1243
(a). Once these assurances are received, payment is auto-
matic, without any act of approval whatsoever. Com-
pliance by recipients with 31 U.S.C. § 1222, as well as the
antidiscrimination provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 1242, and the
anti-matching provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 1223, is not a pre-
condition of payment, but rather those statutes are condi-
tions, the violation of which can result in sanctions being
imposed after exhaustion of the administrative remedies
process.' This automatic payment procedure is consistent
with the intent of Congress that revenue sharing provide
aid to state and local governments without the attachment
of strings. S. Rept. 92-1050, 1972 U.S. Code Cong. and
Adm. News at 3874.
1. The reports submitted to the Secretary, pursuant to 31 U.S.C.§ 1241, are not to give the Secretary an opportunity to give advice
on or consent to the substantive nature of projects using revenue
sharing money but are merely to aid in determining when viola-
tions of the Act occur, and to aid in notifying the citizenry of how
revenue sharing funds are being used. S. Rept. 92-1050, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 16, 1972), found at 1972 U.S. Code Cong.
and Adm. News 3874, 3907.165
The District Court's decision deals with the facts of that case.
The Office of Revenue Sharing will continue to view such transac-
tions on a case-by-case basis. Displacements of local funds which are
merely shams will be set aside.
Amending the Budget
Neither the Act nor the regulations prohibit a recipient govern-
ment from amending its budget to place revenue sharing funds within
a priority expenditure category and thereby "free-up" funds to be used
for other purposes.
Id.
163. For an analysis of other practical obstacles to effective federal supervi-
sion, see The Revenue Sharing Act of 1972: Untied and Untraceable Dollars
from Washington, 10 HARv. J. LEGIS. 276 (1973).
164. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
165. Defendants' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss at 4, Westside Citizens
Ass'n v. Shultz, Civil No. C-C-74-16 (W.D.N.C., filed Oct. 4, 1974).
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Presumably, if a court were to hold that the Treasury Secretary
must prepare an EIS prior to dispensing revenue-sharing monies, that
court could also give the Secretary the necessary powers to collect
the information for the statements and to ensure that local govern-
ments would prepare honest reports. However, in order to make
possible a meaningful impact statement under the Revenue Sharing
Act of 1972, a court would have to change substantially the rela-
tionship as defined in the Act between the federal and local govern-
ments by dramatically increasing federal powers and supervision.
Such a judicial reworking of the Act would seriously conflict with
the manifest legislative intent.
VI. DELEGATING PREPARATION OF IMPACT STATEMENTS:
A METHOD OF SECURING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
UNDER REVENUE SHARING?
In the 94th Congress the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act
is due for congressional renewal. 166 At that time, the question of
NEPA's applicability to revenue sharing may well arise, compelling
Congress either to end academic debate by unambiguously stating
its legislative intent, or to devise a new environmental protection
mechanism designed to appease both the no-strings supporters of the
Revenue Sharing Act and the pro-strings ecology advocates. If Con-
gress seeks a compromise between these opposing positions, one pos-
sible approach will be to require local recipients of federal funds,
rather than the federal government itself, to prepare impact state-
ments. This administrative mechanism has already been adopted by
Congress in the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974.167 Because of its high visibility as an apparent compromise
it deserves some analysis as a possible modification of the Revenue
Sharing Act.
A. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
(Community Development Act) was designed to provide local gov-
ernment with a consolidated block grant program for community de-
velopment to replace 10 categorical grant programs. The Act pro-
vides for allocation of 3-year block grants for formula. As a prereq-
uisite to allocation, local applicants must submit a 3-year summary
166. Hearings on Revenue Sharing, supra note 147, at 2.
167. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633.
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of planned activities and a 1-year specific application including a de-
tailed plan for housing assistance programs.168 The application must
receive approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.16 9 The Secretary
must approve an application unless he determines that the applicant's
statement of community development needs is inconsistent with
available information, its proposed activities are plainly inappropri-
ate to meet the stated needs, or the application does not comply with
the requirements of the Act.170
A statement by Senator William Proxmire, second ranking Demo-
crat on the Subcommittee on Housing of the Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs Committee, suggests that the congressional purpose
behind this block grant proposal was quite similar to that behind gen-
eral revenue sharing in the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act
of 1972. According to Senator Proxmire, "[u]nder the block grant
approach, it is anticipated that much of the red tape and delay asso-
ciated with the present programs will be eliminated. Local govern-
ments will be given more flexibility and responsibility to deal with
the problems of their own community.' 171
Depending on one's perspective, it was either in conflict or in
keeping with this legislative policy that Congress elected in the Com-
munity Development Act to authorize the delegation of responsibility
for preparing an EIS to local recipients.1 72  The House Report ex-
plained the purposes of this provision as follows:
The committee [on Banking and Currency] recognizes
that adjustments must be made between the review pro-
168. Id. §§ 104(a), 106(a).
169. Id. § 103(a)(1).
170. Id. § 104(c).
171. 120 CONG. RFc. 3350 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1974). See text accompany-
ing note 96 supra for the similar intent of general revenue sharing.
172. Pub. L. No. 93-383 § 104(h), 88 Stat. 633. Section 104(h) reads:
(h) (1) In order to assure that the policies of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 are most effectively implemented in
connection with the expenditure of funds under this title, and to as-
sure to the public undiminished protection of the environment, the
Secretary, in lieu of the environmental protection procedures other-
wise applicable, may under regulations provide for the release of
funds for particular projects to applicants who assume all of the re-
sponsibilities for environmental review, decisionmaking, and action
pursuant to such Act that would apply to the Secretary were he to
undertake such projects as Federal projects. The Secretary shall issue
regulations to carry out this subsection only after consultation with
the Council on Environmental Quality.
(2) The Secretary shall approve the release of funds for projects
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cedures utilized to carry out the purposes and requirements
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and the
simplified and streamlined application and review process
contemplated by the bill. The environmental protection
provided by NEPA must be preserved, notwithstanding the
elimination of detailed Federal review of applications for
grants under the block grant program.173
Section 104(h) of the Act provides that if an applicant assumes all
responsibility for environmental review under NEPA that ordinarily
would be required of the Secretary, and if that applicant certifies to
the Secretary that NEPA's procedural requirements have been met,
then the Secretary's approval of such certification shall be deemed
to satisfy his responsibilities for filing impact statements under
NEPA. 1 74 Any applicant who prepares an EIS on behalf of the Sec-
retary must also accept the jurisdiction of the federal courts for pur-
poses of enforcement of NEPA.' 7 5 The Secretary does not have any
power to review the impact statements.' 70
subject to the procedures authorized by this subsection only if, at least
fifteen days prior to such approval and prior to any commitment of
funds to such projects other than for purposes authorized by section
105(a) (12) or for environmental studies, the applicant has submitted
to the Secretary a request for such release accompanied by a certifi-
cation which meets the requirements of paragraph (3). The Secre-
tary's approval of any such certification shall be deemed to satisfy
his responsibilites under the National Environmental Policy Act inso-
far as those responsibilities relate to the applications and releases of
funds for projects to be carried out pursuant thereto which are
covered by such certification.
(3) A certification under the procedures authorized by this sub-
section shall-
(A) be in a form acceptable to the Secretary,
(B) be executed by the chief executive officer or other offi-
cer of the applicant qualified under regulations of the Secretary,
(C) specify that the applicant has fully carried out its re-
sponsibilities as described under paragraph (1) of this subsection,
and
(D) specify that the certifying officer (i) consents to as-
sume the status of a responsible Federal official under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 insofar as the provisions
of such Act apply pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection,
and (ii) is authorized and consents on behalf of the applicant and
himself to accept the jurisdiction of the Federal courts for the pur-
pose of enforcement of his responsibilities as such an official.
173. H.R. REP. No. 93-1114, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974).
174. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 104(h) (2), 88 Stat. 633.
175. Id. § 104(h)(3)(D).
176. See note 187 infra and accompanying text. For a detailed analysis
of HUD's past record with respect to NEPA see Durchslag & Junger, HUD
and the Human Environment: A Preliminary Analysis of the lmpact of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 Upon the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, 58 IowA L. REV. 805 (1973).
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It should first be noted that the Community Development Act
is a special revenue sharing statute,177 analogous to the LEAA block
grant program to which ,NEPA was applied in Ely v. Velde. Thus,
the delegation of EIS responsibilities in the Community Development
Act represents a modification and perhaps a weakening of the gen-
eral principle enunciated by the court of appeals in Ely I and 11.178
Congress' rejection of a pure application of NEPA to a special reve-
nue sharing program, which as a general rule has a higher tolerance
for federal conditions than does general revenue sharing,' 79 strongly
reinforces the view that Congress does not favor a pure application
of NEPA to the Revenue Sharing Act. In view of the similar legis-
lative policies of the two Acts, Congress would not choose a method
any more intricate than the one it chose under the Community De-
velopment Act for intertwining NEPA with the Revenue Sharing Act.
In view of the additional factor that the administrative mechanism
under the Revenue Sharing Act is relatively more automatic, Con-
gress would be more likely to choose a less intricate method if it were
to choose one at all.
It is possible to conclude that this recent modification of NEPA's
application to a program less pristine than general revenue sharing
foreshadows certain rejection in 1976 of any proposal to apply
NEPA's requirements to the Revenue Sharing Act. Senator Jack-
son's reaction to the recent alteration of NEPA's procedures, how-
ever, is edifying in this regard. During Senate debate on the Com-
munity Development Act, Senator Henry Jackson, the author of
NEPA, objected strongly to the delegation of responsibility for impact
statements in that bill. He pointed out that neither delegation under
the Community Development Act nor the exemption in the Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972180 had been debated by
the Senate181 and announced he would attempt to block any weaken-
177. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
178. See notes 73-78 supra and accompanying text.
179. Under the LEAA block grant program in Ely, a mandatory federal in-
volvement, including approval of the final state plan, was a concomitant of re-
ceipt of a block grant. By comparison, general revenue sharing programs are
virtually unencumbered.
180. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1-, 1972).
181. Senator Jackson observed,
In the 92nd Congress, we were forced to accept without debate
and discussion a NEPA provision inserted at the last moment in the
conference report of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972. This provision, which exempted virtually all of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's water pollution control activities from
NEPA's environmental impact statement requirements, was drafted in
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ing of NEPA in subsequent bills.18 2
Despite Senator Jackson's distress over the lack of Senate debate
prior to its taking action that might result in the dilution of NEPA,
his position on the merits of delegating impact statement preparation
appears flexible, if skeptical. On the one hand, he stated that local
governments might be able to draft meaningful impact statements;1 8 3
but on the other, he stressed the lack of a compliance track record
at the local level, the greater resources in the federal government,
and the federal government's statutory responsibility under NEPA
for ecological protection.' 8 4 Senator Jackson's analysis suggests that
after proper study and debate he might favor delegation of EIS re-
sponsibilities as a method of protecting the environment under gen-
eral revenue sharing.
Adoption of a delegation mechanism under general revenue shar-
ing would probably alleviate the administrative tangles inherent in
federal preparation of an EIS based on minimal information from
local governments.' 8 5 Whether it would present an irreconcilable
the conference committee, inserted in the conference report, and sent
to the Senate as a fait accompli....
... Once again [in the Community Development Act] the ex-
emption has been thrust upon the Senate without benefit of study and
debate. S. 3066, as we passed it in the Senate, made no reference
to NEPA whatsoever. The NEPA exemption first appeared in H.R.
15361, which the-House passed 3 months after we had acted on S.
3066.
120 CONG. Rnc. 14,883-84 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1974).
182. One such bill, the Federal Mass Transportation Act of 1974, H.R.
12859, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), had already been reported out of a House
committee. According to Senator Jackson, the bill exempted all projects under
the bill from the EIS requirement of NEPA. Jaokson's promised challenge to
that bill did not occur because the bill died in Senate committee.
183. According to Senator Jackson,
State and local governments may be capable of doing an adequate
job of environmental assessment; this might be particularly true in
the case of HUD, given its past, spotty record of NEPA performance.
Yet, where is the analysis which supports this argument? There has
been no in-depth study or evaluation of the capacity of State and local
governments to assume the most basic NEPA responsibility.
120 CONG. REc. 14,884 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1974).
184. "Granted, there are notable benefits to be derived from reducing Fed-
eral red tape, but the no-strings-attached concept must stop short of delegating
the Federal responsibility for assuring that environmental factors are consid-
ered in governmental decisions...." Id.
185. Local governments could be required to prepare an EIS before they
irrevocably committed federal funds to particular projects, rather than at the
beginning of each entitlement period, when they might not have completed de-
tailed plans for the use of revenue-sharing money. In addition, local govern-
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conflict with the legislative intent behind the State and Local Fiscal
Assistance Act is a more difficult question. The answer depends on
whether Congress, in adopting the Revenue Sharing Act, wished to
avoid all red tape or simply those administrative requirements that
would allow the federal agencies to make daily substantive decisions
about what local priorities should be. Since delegation of EIS re-
sponsibility to local governments would require statutory authoriza-
tion in any event, 186 Congress could define its legislative intent more
clearly in the process of debating the delegation procedure.
B. Evaluation of Delegating Impact Statements Under
Revenue Sharing
Two critical questions in an evaluation of any delegation scheme
in relation to general revenue sharing are whether the particular
scheme is consistent with the no-strings philosophy underlying reve-
nue sharing and whether the deputized BIS drafters will protect the
environment as effectively as federal watchdogs would. As for the
first question, the BIS transferal provisions of the Community Devel-
opment Act essentially impose on local governments a condition
precedent to receiving funds, but do not give federal agencies any
environmental veto power over a project once an impact statement
has been prepared. Local governments have full discretion in utiliz-
ments would be made responsible for policing themselves; thus the Secretary's
lack of prospective enforcement powers would not present a problem. If local
governments failed to comply with NEPA, the remedy would be provided by
the courts, not the Treasury Department.
186. If NEPA does not apply to revenue sharing as now written, the
Treasury Department could not gratuitously impose an EIS requirement on re-
cipients of federal funds. If NEPA does apply, recent cases suggest that the
Treasury Department could not delegate its responsibility without congressional
action.
Until 1972, a number of federal agencies did require local recipients of
funds to draft the NEPA statement. For example, a majority of courts per-
mitted such delegation by the Federal Highway Administration. Anderson,
The National Environmental Policy Act, in FnERAsL ENVmONMENTAL LAw
368-70 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
However, in 1972 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Greene County
Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 849 (1972), which held that the FPC had to file its own impact state-
ment prior to any formal hearings; the FPC was not permitted to use the local
applicant's draft impact statement as a substitute for its own. The court ex-
plained, "The Federal Power Commission has abdicated a significant part of
its responsibility by substituting the statement of PASNY [Power Authority
of the State of New York] for its own. . . . The danger of this procedure
and one obvious shortcoming, is the potential, if not the likelihood, that the
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ing the results of an BIS; persons aggrieved can turn to the courts
but not to the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
plead for ecological preservation.18 7 Thus, federal decisionmaking
about the details of local projects has been avoided.18, However,
a significant administrative burden has been delegated to local recip-
ients, who must now prepare an EIS. Some small local governments
have already claimed that the one-page planned use reports required
by the Revenue Sharing Act are too onerous.' 8 9 The far larger
bureaucratic burden connected with actually preparing an EIS may
diminish the value of funds received and hamper the efficient admin-
istrative mechanism which the drafters of the Revenue Sharing Act
sought to preserve.
Another potentially severe obstacle is presented by the possibility
that numerous suits might be brought by local citizens under NEPA.
The hope of any local government for a quick, easy infusion of fed-
eral dollars into underfinanced local projects could easily be dashed
by the initiation of such NEPA-related litigation. Essentially, the
delegation mechanism would substitute judicial delay for adminis-
trative encumbrances. 'Moreover, courts have recently demonstrated
a willingness to review impact statements substantively as well as
procedurally. 190 Local decision makers would be compelled to share
responsibility for balancing adverse ecological effects against their
community's need for a particular project. In view of the im-
portance attached by members of Congress to autonomous local deci-
sionmaking under revenue sharing, any potential "interference" by
courts applying federal environmental standards would seem to be
inconsistent with the expressed goals of revenue sharing.19'
As for the second question, it is impossible at this point to com-
pare realistically the relative merits of placing responsibility for the
preparation of a revenue sharing EIS on the federal government or
the affected local government. Neither alternative has been tested.
A theoretical evaluation is also difficult since most of the potential
applicant's statement will be based on self-serving assumptions." 455 F.2d at
420.
The holding in Greene was echoed in Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th
Cir. 1972), later that year, signalling a significant shift from the previous
cases, which had allowed the Federal Highway Administration to delegate the
preparation of impact statements.
187. See 40 Fed. Reg. 1399 (1975).
188. But see notes 190-91 infra and accompanying text.
189. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
190. See notes 23-24 supra.
191. See notes 96-97 supra and accompanying text.
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advantages of delegating this responsibility to state and local govern-
ments carry corollary disadvantages.. 92  For instance, delegation of
the responsibility for preparing impact statements under revenue
sharing would permit a meaningful integration of long-range planning
and an anticipation of foreseeable environmental effects of those
plans. Ideally, local planners could spot possible problems early and
plan accordingly. On the other hand, coordination of planning and
evaluation also permits crafty decisionmaking designed to avoid the
delays caused by the filing of a complicated impact statement. Local
E S drafters might also be blinded by their own self interest in a
project. Devices such as full participation by the public would be
needed to minimize overly cozy coordination at the local level.
Delegation of environmental review might also impart a more
sophisticated understanding of subtle environmental problems to
local decisionmakers. The EIS procedure is designed not only to
catch clear environmental blunders, but also to upgrade the general
decisionmaling processes in general by educating and coordinating
the decisionmakers themselves."9 On a more realistic note, how-
ever, local governments can avoid drafting detailed or sophisticated
impact statements by simply earmarking revenue-sharing funds for
policemen's salaries, library operating expenses, and other programs
having minimal environmental effect, while transferring local money
that does not require an EIS to sewage disposal, highway construc-
tion, or other projects with clear ecological impact.19 4 Indeed, as
long as state and local governments can continue to substitute local
funds for federal funds, it may not make much difference whether
impact statements are required at all under revenue sharing, let
alone whether they are the responsibility of the federal or state
governments.
192. For an elaboration of the disadvantages of total delegation and an ar-
gument favoring partial delegation of responsibility for impact statements, see
Anderson, supra note 186, at 372-75; Note, The Application of Federal Environ-
mental Standards to the General Revenue Sharing Program: NEPA and Unre-
stricted Federal Grants, 60 VA. L. REv. 114, 128-31 (1974).
193. Senator Jackson, Senate manager of NEPA, stated, "Section 102(b) re-
quires the development of procedures designed to insure that all relevant en-
vironmental values and amenities are considered in the calculus of project de-
velopment and decisionmaking." 115 CONG. Rnc. 29,055 (1969).
According to the court in Calvert Cliffs' "[t]he apparent purpose of the
'detailed statement' is to aid in the agencies' own decisionmaking process, and
to advise other interested agencies and the public of the environmental conse-
quences of planned federal action .... Only in that fashion is it likely that
the most intelligent, optimally beneficial decision will ultimately be made."
449 F.2d at 1114.
194. See notes 147-51 supra and accompanying text.
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The strongest argument for delegating the responsibility for EIS
preparation to the local level is that a number of states have indi-
cated a willingness and an ability to undertake environmental protec-
tion by passing their own "mini-NEPA" acts.195 Delegation of envi-
ronmental evaluation under revenue sharing would presumably
strengthen this trend, thus protecting nonfederal as well as federal
projects. The difficulties of tracing federal money would be less seri-
ous if all state projects were receiving environmental review.
In sum, the advantage of delegating the responsibility for pre-
paring impact statements to local governments is that delegation is
administratively more practical than leaving that responsibility at the
federal level. But the device still seems to conflict with the Revenue
Sharing Act and is not certain to encourage meaningful consideration
of the environment. Therefore, the delegation mechanism should be
considered for its ease of execution but not for any illusion that it
might present of protecting the environment without imposing federal
strings on local governments.
VII. CONCLUSION
The National Environmental Policy Act and the State and Local
Fiscal Assistance Act are both strong statutes, founded on definite
but conflicting philosophies of governmental coordination. One stat-
ute must bend to accommodate the other. Although the courts have
been fairly consistent in extending NEPA's application to federal
agencies and to other statutes, no precedent compels an automatic
extension of NEPA to cover general revenue sharing. Therefore, the
two statutes can be compared on a clean slate in an effort to reach
the most harmonious accommodation.
Basic to a harmonious accommodation is a comparison of the leg-
islative philosophies of the two Acts. When NEPA was passed, Con-
gress indicated that, with only two exceptions, it was to apply to all
statutes existing at that time. Only the legislative policy underlying
the Revenue Sharing Act can indicate whether Congress recognized
a third exception to NEPA's coverage when it passed the State and
Local Fiscal Assistance Act. An analysis of the limited number of
federal conditions in the final bill and the Senate's support of Senator
Long's stand against further federal strings presents convincing evi-
195. See Yost, NEPA's Progeny: State Environmental Policy Acts, 3 E.L.R.
50,090 (1973). See, e.g., CAL. PuB. REs. CoDE §§ 21000 et seq. (West Supp.
1974); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-5301 et seq. (Bums Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 113A-1 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
[Vol. 25:797
REVENUE SHARING AND NEPA
dence that Congress did not intend any federal stipulations to apply
to revenue-sharing money other than those expressly contained in
the bill.
Perhaps the most crucial determinant of the appropriate balance
between the two Acts is the feasibility of requiring the Secretary of
the Treasury to prepare an environmental impact statement prior to
disbursing revenue-sharing money to local recipients. The impossi-
bility of accurately tracing federal funds through local coffers, and
the Secretary's lack of prospective enforcement powers, which could
be exercised to redirect local spending decisions, indicate that prepa-
ration of an impact statement by the federal government would be
an empty exercise. Thus, the direct conflict with the no-strings
philosophy of the Revenue Sharing Act, coupled with the probable
futility of requiring a federal environmental impact statement, leads
one to conclude that the most amicable balance between the two Acts
requires a modification of NEPA's mandate.
However, those interested in ensuring that environmental alterna-
tives are considered before governmental action is taken will prob-
ably seek a new device to inject ecological protection into the deci-
sionmaking process under general revenue sharing. One such
device-that of imposing responsibility for preparing impact state-
ments on local rather than national government-was adopted by
Congress in 1974 under a special revenue sharing statute. Although
this alternative presents fewer practical obstacles than does a direct
extension of NEPA's requirements, realistically, it imposes just as
many federal strings and conditions. Thus, its adoption would re-
quire a dilution of Congress' initial predilection for local autonomy
under general revenue sharing.
JUDITH HARRIS RAWSON
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